251-266
Original Article
Organized crime and the 1960 presidential election
John J. Binder
267-292
original article
The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world
Christian Bjørnskov, Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer
293-310
Original Article
Letting the good times roll: A theory of voter inference and experimental evidence
John W. Patty and Roberto A. Weber
311-328
Original Article
Public versus private production and economies of scale
Henrik Christoffersen, Martin Paldam and Allan H. Würtz
329-335
Original Article
Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment
Johannes Münster
337-346
original article
Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation
Paul Pecorino and Akram Temimi
347-362
original article
A sheriff, two bullets and three problems
Mike Felgenhauer
363-380
original article
Does capital mobility reduce the corporate-labor tax ratio?
Peter Schwarz
381-393
original article
Democratic institutions versus autocratic regimes: The case of environmental policy
Per G. Fredriksson and Jim R. Wollscheid
395-400
Original Article
1 dictator = 2 voters
Antonio Quesada
401-436
Original Article
A nonlinear principal component analysis of the relationship between budget rules and fiscal performance in the European Union
Francesco Lagona and Fabio Padovano
437-456
Original Article
Why party and how much? The Soviet State and the party finance
Eugenia Belova and Valery Lazarev
457-470
original article
Esteem-based contributions and optimality in public goods supply
Geoffrey Brennan and Michael Brooks
471-493
Original Article
Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption
Omar Azfar and William Robert Nelson
495-497
Book Review
Michael Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. xxiii + 214 pages. USD 35.00 (cloth)
Roy Gardner
499-501
Book review
Gordon Tullock, Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar Publishers, 2005, 153 + vii pp., 2005. USD 75.00 (cloth)
Daniel Sutter
503
Erratum
Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising
Franklin G. Mixon, Chena C. Crocker and H. Tyrone Black