89-90
The vote motive
Gordon Tullock
91-107
Using state-level simulations in a political economy model of US trade policy
Hugh M. Arce, Robert B. Koopman and Marinos Tsigas
109-123
How does ideology matter in the spatial model of voting?
Garrett R. Beeler Asay
125-130
A stochastic derivation of the ratio form of contest success functions
Hao Jia
131-150
Partisan politics and stock market performance: The effect of expected government partisanship on stock returns in the 2002 German federal election
Roland Füss and Michael M. Bechtel
151-164
Liberalization and rent-seeking in China’s labor market
John A. Bishop and Haiyong Liu
165-182
The second-order dilemma of public goods and capital accumulation
Akira Okada
183-205
Political freedom, economic freedom, and income convergence: Do stages of economic development matter?
Zhenhui Xu and Haizheng Li
207-223
Political instability and inflation volatility
Ari Aisen and Francisco José Veiga
225-236
Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information
Mark Fey
237-255
Going once, going twice, sold! The committee assignment process as an all-pay auction
Daniel J. Lee
257-276
Social preferences and private provision of public goods: A ‘double critical mass’ model
Angelo Antoci, Pier Luigi Sacco and Luca Zarri
277-289
Step return versus net reward in the voluntary provision of a threshold public good: An adversarial collaboration
Charles Bram Cadsby, Rachel Croson, Melanie Marks and Elizabeth Maynes
291-300
Influencing rent-seeking contests
Robert A. Ritz
301-317
Taxation and presidential approval: separate effects from tax burden and tax structure turbulence?
Benny Geys and Jan Vermeir
319-336
Supersized votes: ballot length, uncertainty, and choice in direct legislation elections
Peter Selb
337-352
US presidential elections and real GDP growth, 1961–2004
Kevin Grier
353-373
Making the first move
A two-stage analysis of the role of formateurs in parliamentary government formation
Hanna Bäck and Patrick Dumont
375-397
The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror
Jean-Paul Azam and Véronique Thelen
399-413
Functional unpleasantness: the evolutionary logic of righteous resentment
William B. Heller and K. K. Sieberg
415-448
Trending economic factors and the structure of Congress in the growth of government, 1930–2002
Stanley L. Winer, Michael W. Tofias, Bernard Grofman and John H. Aldrich
449-468
Electoral politics and monetary policy: does the Bank of Canada contribute to a political business cycle?
J. Stephen Ferris
469-484
Swing and a myth: a review of Caplan’s
The Myth of the Rational Voter
Loren Lomasky
485-487
Reflections on Caplan’s
The Myth of the Rational Voter
Gordon Tullock
489-492
Book Review
John Samples. The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. xiii + 375 pages. USD $29.00 (cloth)
William L. Anderson
493-496
Book Review
Peter Emerson, ed.,
Designing an All-Inclusive Democracy: Consensual Voting Procedures For Use in Parliaments, Councils and Committees
Berlin: Springer, 2007, xiii + 186 pp. USD $99.00 (cloth)
Joel Parker
497-499
Book Review
Mark Gradstein and Kai A. Konrad (Eds.) Institutions and Norms in Economic Development
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006. xv+234 pages. USD 30.00 (cloth)
Mwangi S. Kimenyi
501-503
Book Review
Peter Bernholz and Roland Vaubel (eds.): Political competition and economic regulation
London, Routledge, 2007, xii + 281 Pages, USD 135.00 (cloth)
Horst Feldmann