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Volume 1 / 1966 - Volume 151 / 2012
263-272
Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson
273-299
Islam’s democracy paradox: Muslims claim to like democracy, so why do they have so little?
Charles K. Rowley and Nathanael Smith
301-315
Campaign contributions as a commitment device
Zacharias Maniadis
317-333
Seat-vote curves, loyalty effects and the provincial distribution of Canadian government spending
Vaughan Dickson
335-342
The uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games with risk-averse players
Takeshi Yamazaki
343-356
It’s the economy, and then some: modeling the presidential vote with state panel data
Leo H. Kahane
357-369
Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding
Gil S. Epstein and Yosef Mealem
371-387
Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance
Claudia R. Williamson
389-411
Fiscal adjustments: do labor and product market institutions matter?
Athanasios Tagkalakis
413-428
Coalition politics and accountability
Áron Kiss
429-441
Does trading votes in national elections change election outcomes?
Frank Daumann and Alfred Wassermann
443-459
The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract
Peter T. Leeson
461-492
Choice of law and legal evolution: rethinking the market for legal rules
Emanuela Carbonara and Francesco Parisi
493-507
Federal, state, and local governments: evaluating their separate roles in US growth
Matthew J. Higgins, Andrew T. Young and Daniel Levy
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