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Revising Nonmonotonic Theories: The Case of Defeasible Logic
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Revising Nonmonotonic Theories: The Case of Defeasible Logic
D. Billington3 , G. Antoniou3 , G. Governatori3 and M. Maher3 
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School of Computing and Information Technology, Griffith University, QLD 4111, Australia |
Abstract
The revision and transformation of knowledge is widely recognized as a key issue in knowledge representation and reasoning.
Reasons for the importance of this topic are the fact that intelligent systems are gradually developed and refined, and that
often the environment of an intelligent system is not static but changes over time. Traditionally belief revision has been
concerned with revising first order theories.
Nonmonotonic reasoning provides rigorous techniques for reasoning with incomplete information. Until recently the dynamics
of nonmonotonic reasoning approaches has attracted little attention. This paper studies the dynamics of defeasible logic,
a simple and efficient form of nonmonotonic reasoning based on defeasible rules and priorities. We define revision and contraction
operators and propose postulates. Our postulates try to follow the ideas of AGM belief revision as far as possible, but some
AGM postulates clearly contradict the nonmonotonic nature of defeasible logic, as we explain. Finally we verify that the operators
satisfy the postulates.
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