In his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.4, Rāmānuja argues that the knowledge of the liberated person precludes ignorance and its effects, and therefore precludes the possibility of jīvanmukti (embodied liberation). The Advaitin replies that the knowledge of the liberated is consistent with a certain kind of karma that prolongs embodiment, hence jīvanmukti is possible. In his Bhagavadgītābhāṣya 2.12, however, Rāmānuja points out that even if the jīvanmukta (embodied liberated person) still experiences appearances, he does not count them as reasons for acting, and therefore does not act. Hence Rāmānuja’s objection to jīvanmukti is both conceptual and practical, and it is the practical problem that is the more difficult to resolve.