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Winner Determination Algorithms for Electronic Auctions: A Framework Design
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Winner Determination Algorithms for Electronic Auctions: A Framework Design
Martin Bichler7 , Jayant Kalagnanam7 , Ho Soo Lee7 and Juhnyoung Lee7 
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IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, 10598 NY, USA |
Abstract
During the past few years, auctions have become popular in conducting trade negotiations on the Internet. The design of new
auctions and other negotiation protocols has become an important topic for both, industry and academia. Traditional auction
mechanisms allow price-only negotiations for which the winner determination is a computationally simple task. However, the
need for new auction mechanisms that allow complex bids such as bundle bids and multi-attribute bids has been raised in many
situations. The winner determination in these auctions is a computationally hard problem. The computational complexity has
been a significant hurdle for the widespread use of these advanced auction models. In this paper, we will outline the auction
design space and classify resource allocation algorithms along multiple dimensions. Then, we will explain the design of an
object framework providing an API to different types of winner determination algorithms. This framework enables application
programmers to specify buyer preferences, allocation rules and supplier offerings in a declarative manner, and solve the allocation
problems without having to re-implement the computationally complex algorithms.
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