Welcome!
To use the personalized features of this site, please log in or register.
If you have forgotten your username or password, we can help.
|
 |
Fast Primitives for Internal Data Scrambling in Tamper Resistant Hardware
| |
|
Fast Primitives for Internal Data Scrambling in Tamper Resistant Hardware
Eric Brier7  , Helena Handschuh8 and Christophe Tymen9
| (7) |
Card Security Group, Gemplus Card International, Parc d’Activités de Gémenos, B.P. 100, 13881 Gémenos, France |
| (8) |
Gemplus Card International, 34 rue Guynemer, 92447 Issy-les-Moulineaux, France |
| (9) |
École Normale Supérieure, 45 rue d’Ulm, 75230 Paris, France |
Abstract
Although tamper-resistant devices are specifically designed to thwart invasive attacks, they remain vulnerable to micro-probing.
Among several possibilities to provide data obfuscations, keyed hardware permutations can provide compact design and easy
diversification. We discuss the efficiency of such primitives, and we give several examples of implementations, along with
proofs of effectively large key-space.
Keywords Tamper-resistance - Probing attacks - Data scrambling - Keyed permutations - Smart-cards
Fulltext Preview (Small, Large)
 References secured to subscribers.
|
|
|
|
|
|