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Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider
i-xlii
Front matter
3-324
Part 1 / Essays
3-31
Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy
32-48
Public Choice: An Introduction
49-59
Are Vote and Popularity Functions Economically Correct?
60-67
Constitutional Political Economy
67-76
Corruption
77-90
Dictatorship
91-96
Environmental Politics
96-104
Experimental Public Choice
105-117
Gordon Tullock at Four Score Years: An Evaluation
118-129
Interest Group Behavior and Influence
129-138
International Trade Policy: Departure from Free Trade
139-145
James M. Buchanan
146-159
Milton Friedman, 1912: Harbinger of the Public Choice Revolution
159-172
Monetary Policy and Central Bank Behavior
173-191
The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters
191-201
Public Choice from the Perspective of Economics
201-214
Public Choice from the Perspective of the History of Thought
214-235
Public Choice Theory from the Perspective of Law
235-244
Public Choice from the Perspective of Philosophy
244-251
Public Choice from the Perspective of Sociology
252-262
Public Finance
263-283
Regulation and Antitrust
284-286
Scholarly Legacy of Mancur Olson
286-296
Shadow Economy
296-305
Social Choice, Contracts and Logrolling
305-311
Spatial Theory
312-320
Trade Liberalization and Globalization
321-324
William H. Riker
327-943
Part 2 / Concepts
327-329
Academia
329-333
Al-Qaeda
333-336
Alternative Voting Methods
336-340
Altruism
341-344
The Anatomy of Political Representation
344-346
Approval Voting
346-349
Arbitration and Bargaining
349-351
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
351-356
An ‘Austrian’ Perspective on Public Choice
356-358
Autocracy
358-362
Autocratic Succession
363-365
Bicameralism
365-367
Blackmail
367-369
Black’s Single-Peakedness Condition
370-373
Budgetary Processes
373-377
Budget Deficits
377-382
Bureaucratic Discretion
383-385
Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance
386-390
Campaign Finance 1
390-393
Campaign Finance 2
393-397
Central Banks
398-399
Chicago Political Economy
399-402
The Clayton Act
402-407
Coalitions and Power Indices
407-409
Coalitions and Social Choice
409-415
Coase Theorem and Political Markets
415-417
Coercion
417-419
Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation
419-422
Committee Assignments
422-424
Committee Jurisdictions and PAC Contributions
424-426
Committees in Legislatures
426-428
Commons and Anticommons
428-429
Constitution
429-430
Constitutional Frameworks and Economic Progress
430-436
The Constitution of the European Union
436-440
440-445
The Contemporary Political Economy Approach to Bureaucracy
445-447
Contractarianism
447-450
Corruption 1
450-454
Corruption 2
454-456
Cost and Choice
456-460
The Cost Disease of the Personal Services
460-463
Customary Law
464-466
The Demand-Revealing Process
466-470
Deregulation of Postal Service
470-473
Dictators and Social Contracts
473-477
Direct Democracy
477-481
Discrimination
481-484
Dynamic Inconsistency
485-487
Economic Freedom and its Measurement
487-496
Economic Freedom and Political Freedom
496-499
Economic Regulation
499-504
The Economic Theory of Clubs
504-507
Economists Versus the Public on Economic Policy
507-510
Education and the State
510-513
Efficiency of Democracy
513-519
Efficiency of Democracy?
519-522
The Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis
522-525
Elected Versus Appointed Regulators
525-530
Election Models
530-532
Electoral College
532-535
Electoral Competition in Mixed Systems of Representation
535-537
The Elusive Median Voter
537-540
Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle
540-543
Endogenous Morality
543-548
Enron
548-553
Environmental Politics and Economic Development
553-554
The Euro
554-556
European Political Integration
556-561
Evolution of Institutions
561-564
The Evolution of Law
564-567
Experimental Economics and Public Choice
567-569
569-571
Expressive Voting and Redistribution
572-574
Fair Division
574-575
Fame and Politics
575-578
Federal Reserve System
578-580
Forecasting Presidential Elections in the United States
581-582
Game Theory
582-585
Game Theory in Public Choice
585-588
Generality and the Efficiency of Government Decision Making
588-592
Group Roles in Evolution and Cognition
592-594
Growth of Local Government in the United States
594-597
The Growth of Public Expenditure
597-602
The Growth of the Relative Size of Government
603-605
Heresthetics and the Evolution of the Us Constitution
605-608
Homo Economicus
608-614
Human Evolution and Political Behavior
615-621
Ideology
621-624
The Importance of the Middle in Spatial Politics
624-628
Initiative and Referendum
628-631
Institutions of Trade Protection
631-636
Interest Groups 1
636-639
Interest Groups 2
639-643
International Game of Power
643-644
International Organization
645-647
Internet Voting
647-650
Is Russia a Market Economy?
650-653
Is Voting Rational?
653-657
The Italian Public Finance Contribution to Public Choice
658-664
The Judiciary
665-667
The Law and Economics Movement
667-671
Legal Precedents and Judicial Discretion
671-674
Legal Rules and Standards
674-677
Legislative Politics
677-680
Legislators
680-684
Leviathan Models of Government
684-687
Logic of Collective Action
687-696
The Logic of Liberty
696-699
Logrolling 1
699-701
Logrolling 2
702-704
Meddlesome Preferences and Rent Extraction: The Tobacco Shakedown
704-706
The Median in Politics
707-712
The Median Voter Model
712-713
Medieval Church
713-715
Mercantilism
715-718
Monetary Politics
719-722
The New Deal
722-724
Nonprofit Organizations
725-727
The Origins of Social Choice Theory
728-731
The Paradox of Rebellion
731-734
Parchment Versus Guns
734-736
Political and Cultural Nationalism
736-740
Political Business Cycles
740-743
Political Economics and Public Choice
743-745
The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments
745-749
The Political Economy of Italian Electoral Reform
749-754
Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation
754-758
Pressure Groups and Uninformed Voters
758-761
Principal-Agent Relationships in the Theory of Bureaucracy
762-764
Prohibition
764-769
Public Choice and Socialism
769-773
Public Choice and the Chicago School of Antitrust
773-775
Public Choice in Italy
775-778
Public Enterprise
778-780
Public Finance and the Median Voter Model
780-782
Public Finance in Democratic Process
782-784
Public Goods
784-787
Public Schools
787-789
Public Utility Regulation
790-793
Rational Choice Approaches to Economic and Political History
793-795
Rational Ignorance
795-797
Rational Irrationality
797-802
Reciprocity
802-804
Redistributive Politics 1
804-807
Redistributive Politics 2
807-809
Regulating Government
809-816
Regulatory Takings
816-817
Rent Dissipation
818-820
Rent Extraction
820-824
Rent Seeking
824-827
Rent Seeking and Political Institutions
827-829
Rent-Seeking Games
829-832
Rent Seeking in Development
832-835
The Rule of Law
835-841
Rules Versus Standards
842-844
Self-Interest
844-845
Selfish Gene
845-849
September 11, 2001
849-853
Single-Peaked Preferences and Median Voter Theorems
853-857
The Social Cost of Rent Seeking
857-860
Sortition
860-863
Standard Oil and Microsoft: Antitrust Lessons
863-865
State-Sponsored Murder as a Rent-Seeking Activity
865-867
Structure-Induced Equilibrium
867-872
Supply of Public Goods
872-875
The Supreme Court
876-880
Takings and Public Choice: The Persuasion of Price
880-881
Term Limits 1
882-885
Term Limits 2
885-890
Terrorism
890-892
The Theory and Measurement of Economic Freedom
892-897
Totalitarianism
897-903
Trade Protectionism
903-907
Transitional Economies
907-911
Transitions from Autocracy to Democracy
911-913
Triangulation
914-916
Underground Government: The Off-Budget Public Sector
917-919
The Value of Voting Rights
919-921
Votes for Women
921-923
Voting Equipment, Minorities and the Poor
923-926
Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections
926-929
Voting Paradoxes in List Systems of Proportional Representation
930-933
The War on Drugs
933-937
Welfare Economics and Public Choice
937-940
Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State
940-943
Why Government Succeeds
943-1106
Back matter
1-1
Charles K. Rowley
Dennis C. Mueller
Martin Paldam
Susan Rose-Ackerman
Ronald Wintrobe
Hannelore Weck-Hannemann
Arthur J. H. C. Schram
Frans van Winden
Arye L. Hillman
Robert D. Tollison
Charles K. Rowley and Anne Rathbone
Manfred Gärtner
Stanley L. Winer and Walter Hettich
Francesco Parisi
Hartmut Kliemt
Viktor J. Vanberg
Harvey S. Rosen
William F. Shughart
Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger
Friedrich Schneider
Peter Bernholz
John Aldrich
325-325
Susanne Lohmann
Anne Rathbone and Charles K. Rowley
Bernard Grofman
Paul H. Rubin
Tim R. Sass
Steven J. Brams
Paul Pecorino
Peter Boettke and Peter Leeson
Gordon Tullock
Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain
Walter E. Williams
W. Mark Crain
Laura Langbein
Thomas Stratmann
Edward J. López
Filip Palda
Carlos D. Ramírez
Manfred J. Holler
Itai Sened
Sebastiano Bavetta and Antonio Cognata
Keith Dougherty
Michael Munger
Michael C. Munger
Randall G. Holcombe
Franciesco Parisi and Ben Depoorter
Gerald W. Scully
Stephanie Schmid-Lubbert and Hans-Bernd Schafer
Stefan Voigt
Thomas E. Borcherding and Portia D. Besocke
Francesco Forte
Omar Azfar
William J. Baumol
T. Nicolaus Tideman
Michael A. Crew and Paul R. Kleindorfer
John G. Matsusaka
Sebastiano Bavetta
Wenbo Wu and Otto A. Davis
Gary M. Anderson, William F. Shughart and Robert D. Tollison
Bryan Caplan
Eugenia F. Toma
Donald Wittman
Charles K. Rowley and Michelle A. Vachris
Timothy Besley
Peter J. Coughlin
Ram Mudambi and Pietro Navarra
Thomas Romer
Bruce L. Benson
Michael Reksulak and William F. Shughart
Roger D. Congleton
Roland Vaubel
Earl Thompson
Lisa R. Anderson and Charles A. Holt
Vernon L. Smith
Russell S. Sobel and Gary A. Wagner
Tyler Cowen
Mark Toma
Henry Chappell
Robin D. Hanson
Adam Gifford
Alan Turner Peacock
Thomas E. Borcherding and Dong Lee
Norman Schofield
Otto A. Davis and Melvin J. Hinich
Willem Thorbecke
Arnold B. Urken
Ekaterina Stepykina
Domenico Da Empoli
Gary M. Anderson
Ben Deoorter and Francesco Parisi
Hans-Bernd Schaefer
Fabio Padovano
Emory Peters and Charles K. Rowley
Joe Oppenheimer
Richard E. Wagner
Robert B. Ekelund
James T. Bennett and William P. Snavely
Richard E. Wagner and Holbert L. Harris
Frank Buckley and Francesco Parisi
Thomas D. Willett and Manfred W. Keil
Thomas A. Garrett and Russell S. Sobel
Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio
Charlotte A. L. Twight
Michelle A. Vachris
Mark Thornton
Peter J. Boettke and Peter T. Leeson
Fred S. McChesney
Louis De Alessi
Laura Razzolini
Lawrence W. Kenny
J. R. Clark and Dwight R. Lee
Karol Boudreaux
Amihai Glazer
Peter J. Boettke and Ryan Oprea
Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer
David N. Laband
Alan A. Lockard
Donald J. Boudreaux
Brian Goff
William A. Fischel
Bruce Bender
William H. Kaempfer, Edward Tower and Thomas D. Willett
Michael J. G. Cain
James T. Bennett
Stephen Knack
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