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Distinguishing TEA from a Random Permutation: Reduced Round Versions of TEA Do Not Have the SAC or Do Not Generate Random Numbers
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Distinguishing TEA from a Random Permutation: Reduced Round Versions of TEA Do Not Have the SAC or Do Not Generate Random
Numbers
Julio César Hernández5 , José María Sierra5 , Arturo Ribagorda5 , Benjamín Ramos5 and J. C. Mex-Perera6 
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Computer Security Group, Carlos III University, 28911 Madrid, Leganés, Spain |
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Cryptography & Computer Communications Security Group, Bradford University, Bradford, UK |
Abstract
In this paper the authors present a statistical test for testing the strict avalanche criterion (SAC), a property that cryptographic
primitives such as block ciphers and hash functions must have. Random permutations should also behave as good random number
generators when, given any initial input, its output is considered part of a pseudorandom stream and then used as an input
block to produce more output bits. Using these two ideal properties, we construct a test framework for cyptographic primitives
that is shown at work on the block cipher TEA. In this way, we are able to distinguish reduced round versions of it from a
random permutation.
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