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Unconditionally Secure Approximate Message Authentication
| Book Series | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Publisher | Springer Berlin / Heidelberg |
| ISSN | 0302-9743 (Print) 1611-3349 (Online) |
| Volume | Volume 5557/2009 |
| Book | Coding and Cryptology |
| DOI | 10.1007/978-3-642-01877-0 |
| Copyright | 2009 |
| ISBN | 978-3-642-01813-8 |
| DOI | 10.1007/978-3-642-01877-0_19 |
| Pages | 233-247 |
| Subject Collection | Computer Science |
| SpringerLink Date | Sunday, June 07, 2009 |
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Unconditionally Secure Approximate Message Authentication
Dongvu Tonien19  , Reihaneh Safavi-Naini19 , Peter Nickolas20 and Yvo Desmedt21
| (19) |
Department of Computer Science, University of Calgary, Canada |
| (20) |
School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Wollongong, Australia |
| (21) |
Department of Computer Science, University College University of London, UK |
Abstract
Approximate message authentication codes (AMAC) arise naturally in biometric and multimedia applications where plaintexts
are fuzzy and a tagged message ( x′, t) where t is the calculated tag for a message x that is ‘close’ to x′ should pass the verification test. Fuzziness of plaintexts can be due to a variety of factors including applying acceptable
transforms such as compression and decompression to data, or inaccuracy of sensors in reading biometric data.
This paper develops a framework for approximate message authentication systems in unconditionally security setting. We give formal definition of AMAC and analyze two attacks, impersonation attack and substitution attack. We derive lower
bounds on an opponent’s deception probability in these attacks under the assumption that all keys are equiprobable. Our bounds
generalize known combinatorial bounds in classical authentication theory.
Keywords approximate authentication - biometric authentication - unconditional security
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