Volume 5, Numbers 1-2, 88-100, DOI: 10.1007/BF02291205

Kosten und Streitwert in Verfahren wegen unlauteren Wettbewerbs aus verbraucherpolitischer Sicht

Annette Kur

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Abstract

Der Beitrag berichtet über die Ergebnisse einer rechtstatsächlichen Untersuchung über Streitwert und Kosten in Verfahren wegen unlauteren Wettbewerbs, die vom Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Wettbewerbsrecht, München, durchgeführt wurde. Bei der Bestandsaufnahme von Streitwerten in Verfahren wegen unlauteren Wettbewerbs in über 3000 einschlägigen Fällen bestätigte sich der allgemein vorherrschende Eindruck, daß die Streitwerte in Wettbewerbssachen im Vergleich zu den «normalen» Zivilverfahren außerordentlich hoch sind. Für die gem. 13 Abs. 1 a UWK klagebefugten Verbrauchervereine folgt daraus, daß die Kostenbelastung bei einem Unterliegen im Prozeß schon bei durchschnittlicher Streitwerthöhe zu einem ernsten Problem werden kann. Die Einstellung der Gerichte zur Gewährung der Streitwertbegünstigung gem. § 23 a UWG ist uneinheitlich; von einigen Gerichten wird in dieser Hinsicht eine sehr restriktive Auffassung vertreten. Eine Auswertung der im Verlauf der Untersuchung bekanntgewordenen Fälle, in denen der Verbraucherschutzverein in Berlin von der ihm gewährten Streitwertbegünstigung wegen Unterliegens in der Sache Gebrauch machen mußte, hat ergeben, daß die Belastung der gewerblichen Wirtschaft weder nach ihrem Umfang noch den sachlichen Umständen ihrer Realisierung nach als unbillig oder gar unzumutbar angesehen werden kann.
The present article deals with the results of a study on ldquolitigation valuerdquo and the costs of unfair competition litigation. In German procedural law, ldquolitigation valuerdquo is the sum representing the value of the plaintiff's interests involved in the case, or — if it is not a personal interest, but, as is the case with claims made by consumer associations, rather a general one — the public interest involved in the claim as expressed in monetary value. This value determines the magnitude of the costs (court costs and lawyer fees) that the losing party has to pay.
According to the prevailing opinion, litigation value in unfair competition litigation is usually very high, compared with normal litigation in civil cases. By gathering the data of more than 3000 cases, the study was able to verify this impression. For consumer associations, which, according to § 13 sec. 1 a UWG, have the right to act as a plaintiff in cases of special interest for consumers, this means that the costs of losing a case, even one of average importance, can be ruinous. Courts have, however, the possibility to ldquosplit uprdquo the litigation value, that is, fix a low sum as litigation value regarding the ldquopoor partyrdquo (which in this case would be the consumer association), while the normal value remains valid for the other party. The main effect of the splitting-up is that the poor party, if the case should be lost, only has to pay both court costs and lawyer's fees according to the ldquolowrdquo value, while the other party, even if he won the case, has to pay the difference. As the study reveals, this regulation meets with varying degrees of approval from the courts' side; some courts seem to be fairly restrictive in handling it. Due to this, consumer associations cannot know beforehand if they will be granted the benefit of ldquovalue-splitting,rdquo and thus have to refrain from any further procedural activities if they do not feel able to take the full risk — this effect, of course, from the consumer's point of view, is a very unfavourable one. On the other hand, it is argued that the obligation to bear part of the costs will place an unfair burden on the ldquoinnocentrdquo winner. However, an enumeration of those cases in which one important consumer association, the Verbraucherschutzverein in Berlin, had to take advantage of the above mentioned litigation value assessment, shows that the effect for the opponent has not been as damaging as could have been expected.

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