Traditional methods of evaluating transmission expansions focus on the social impact of the investments based on the current
generation stock which may include firm generation expansion plans. In this paper, we evaluate the social welfare implications
of transmission investments based on equilibrium models characterizing the competitive interaction among generation firms
whose decisions in generation capacity investments and production are affected by both the transmission investments and the
congestion management protocols of the transmission system operator. Our analysis shows that both the magnitude of the welfare
gains associated with transmission investments and the location of the best transmission expansions may change when the generation
expansion response is taken into consideration. We illustrate our results using a 30-bus network example.
Keywords Cournot–Nash equilibrium - Market power - Mathematical program with equilibrium constraints - Network expansion planning - Power system economics - Proactive network planner
JEL Classifications D43 - L13 - L22 - L94
An erratum to this article can be found at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-006-9012-x