This paper examines the adequacy of commitment change, as a measure of the successful resolution of a difference of opinion.
I argue that differences of opinion are only effectively resolved if commitments undertaken in argumentation survive beyond
its conclusion and go on to govern an arguer’s actions in everyday life, e.g., by serving as premises in her practical reasoning.
Yet this occurs, I maintain, only when an arguer’s beliefs are changed, not merely her commitments.
Keywords Acceptance - Argumentation - Belief - Commitment - Difference of opinion - Resolution of a difference of opinion
Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the University of Windsor Research Group in Argumentation and Informal Logic
in November 2005 and February 2007, and at the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation conference Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground (Windsor, Ontario, June 6–9, 2007). I would like to thank J. Anthony Blair, Ralph H. Johnson, Christopher W. Tindale, and
especially Robert C. Pinto for their helpful comments on these earlier versions. Research for this paper was made possible
by a Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada research fellowship and the University of Windsor.