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A Simulation of the Market for Offenses in Multiagent Systems: Is Zero Crime Rates Attainable?

A Simulation of the Market for Offenses in Multiagent Systems: Is Zero Crime Rates Attainable?

Book SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer Berlin / Heidelberg
ISSN0302-9743 (Print) 1611-3349 (Online)
VolumeVolume 2581/2003
BookMulti-Agent-Based Simulation II
DOI10.1007/3-540-36483-8
Copyright2003
ISBN978-3-540-00607-7
DOI10.1007/3-540-36483-8_13
Pages217-226
Subject CollectionComputer Science
SpringerLink DateWednesday, January 01, 2003
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A Simulation of the Market for Offenses in Multiagent Systems: Is Zero Crime Rates Attainable?

Pinata Winoto4 Contact Information

(4)  Department of Computer Science, University of Saskatchewan, SK S7N5A9 Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, CANADA
Abstract
The equilibrium of the market for offenses is studied by means of a multi-agent based simulation. The results show more detailed properties of the market’s equilibrium compared to the theoretical results derived by Fender [8]. Some preliminary results are described.
Agents may adopt random/mixed strategies, which violate the rational choice theory.

Contact Information Pinata Winoto
Email: piw410@mail.usask.ca
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