It is nowadays a dominant opinion in a number of disciplines (anthropology, genetics, psychology, philosophy of science) that
the taxonomy of human races does not make much biological sense. My aim is to challenge the arguments that are usually thought
to invalidate the biological concept of race. I will try to show that the way “race” was defined by biologists several decades
ago (by Dobzhansky and others) is in no way discredited by conceptual criticisms that are now fashionable and widely regarded
as cogent. These criticisms often arbitrarily burden the biological category of race with some implausible connotations, which
then opens the path for a quick eliminative move. However, when properly understood, the biological notion of race proves
remarkably resistant to these deconstructive attempts. Moreover, by analyzing statements of some leading contemporary scholars
who support social constructivism about race, I hope to demonstrate that their eliminativist views are actually in conflict
with what the best contemporary science tells us about human genetic variation.
Keywords Race - Social constructivism - Genetics - Geographical ancestry - Human variation - Philosophy of science