Multiple realization was once taken to be a challenge to reductionist visions, especially within cognitive science, and a
foundation of the “antireductionist consensus.” More recently, multiple realization has come to be challenged on naturalistic
grounds, as well as on more “metaphysical” grounds. Within cognitive science, one focal issue concerns the role of neural
plasticity for addressing these issues. If reorganization maintains the same cognitive functions, that supports claims for
multiple realization. I take up the reorganization involved in language dysfunctions to deal with questions concerned with
multiple realization and neural plasticity. Beginning with Broca’s case for localization and the nineteenth century discussion
of “reorganization,” and returning to more recent evidence for neural plasticity, I argue that, in the end, there is substantial
support for multiple realization in cognitive systems; I further argue that this is wholly consistent with a recognition of
methodological pluralism in cognitive science.
Keywords Broca - Localization - Language functions - Methodological pluralism - Multiple realization - Neural plasticity - Reductionism
I have had the opportunity to discuss these ideas with many people over many years. Most recently, Ken Aizawa, Bill Bechtel,
John Bickle, Peggy DesAutels, Tom Polger, Larry Shapiro, Jackie Sullivan, and Larry Jost. The ideas were discussed at a workshop
at the University of Cincinnati, Centenary College, the University of Georgia, and the Universität Osnabrück. In each case,
they have led me to modify my views. The views also benefited from discussion at the Philosophy of Science Association in
2007, where Polger, Shapiro, Sullivan and I shared the stage, discussing related topics. Those papers are forthcoming in Philosophy of Science.