David Hume is widely believed to be one of the founders of functionalism. His principles of association are seen as an early attempt to articulate a mechanics of the mind akin to Newtonian mechanics. It is argued that this view is based on a failure to appreciate that Hume''s skepticism about reason extends to our ability to understand the representation of everyday knowledge. For Hume there are
secret operations
of the mind, operations for which functional explanations are not forthcoming. Hume''s place in the history of cognitive science is reevaluated in light of his views on common sense knowledge and belief formation.
Key words Hume - cognitive science - history of - knowledge representation - functionalism
An earlier draft of this paper was delivered at a session of theFourth Computers and Philosophy Conference. I''d like to thank Herbert Simon for helpful comments at that session. Penetrating comments from an anonymous referee forMinds and Machines on an earlier version of this paper prompted what I hope are significant improvements, though I, of course, am responsible for any remaining defects.