My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations
that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of themetaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about theepistemological status of introspective beliefs.
I owe a large debt to Sydney Shoemaker. I have been helped considerably both by conversations with him and by the lectures
he gave in the summer of 1985 in his N.E.H. Summer Seminar on Self-Consciousness and Self-Reference. I have also received
valuable advice from Richard Lee, David Roach, David A. Schroeder, Lynne Spellman, and (especially) Anthony L. Brueckner,
Willem de Vries, and David H. Westendorf.