Some implications of the view that the mind is a suitably complex kind of process are investigated in various contexts. The underlying theme is that the behavior of complex systems cannot be adequately judged by that of simple systems. I first present a personal exploration of the mechanistic account of the mind in terms of non-technical considerations; then I present and criticize some ideas of Kripke, Nagel, and Jackson that challenge the mechanistic view. Next, I turn to a brief synopsis of some of Dennett's recent ideas. Finally, I offer some critical comments on Dennett's views and suggest possible modifications.
It is a great pleasure for me to be able to dedicate this essay to Jack Minker in celebration of his 65th birthday and of the many contributions he has made to research, to human rights, and to education (of students and colleagues alike). May he continue with us at the University of Maryland for many more productive years! I would like to say, on a personal note, that in my early years here as a naive floundering young assistant professor (well, not so young, but certainly naive and floundering) I was — in Jack's colorful phrasing — a 
dead duck
until, that is, Jack took me under his wing and educated me in how to carry on a vigorous research program. He got me interested in circumscription; co-authored papers with me; showed me how to isolate open problems; write grants; take bad reviews constructively; and eventually he weaned me into a live duck! Jack: thanks, very much.