In this chapter we will focus on the relation between the ethical Husserlian project and the theory of intentionality. We would like to show how the ethical project influences on the progress of phenomenological research and compels Husserl to uphold some original thesis about reason and its intentional skill. Husserl wants to become an “Aristoteles der reinen Ethik” through an ethical project aimed to the foundation of an ethical science analogous to the logical science (described by himself in Prolegomena). This project plays a strategic role in the Husserlian thought. In fact, it is based on a parallelism (Parallelismus) between the modalizations of reason (Vernunftarten) of the consciousness. Following Husserl ethics should be shaped on the same rational structure of logic and it should have the same validity of logics. Nevertheless, the characteristics of the practical reason are different from those of logical reason. The practical reason in fact, is linked to the sphere of sentiments, feelings, instincts and it cannot be perfectly intentional. Husserl himself defines the practical acts as nearly intentional acts. Hence, in the chapter we will show that the parallelism is imperfect. Moreover we will show the theoretical consequences of Husserlian ethical position respect to the modification of his definition of intentionality.