This article shows that the economic analyses of rescue laws developed in the ‘70s are the outcome of a long-term process
that began at the end of the 1950s with the passing of the first legislations intended to promote and control rescue behaviour
(the so-called “good Samaritan” legislations, acts or statutes) and that finally results in the economic models of rescue
developed by Landes and Posner (The Journal of Legal Studies, 7(1):83–128, 1978a; The American Economic Review, 68(2):417–421,
1978b). The article investigates the context that made the occurrence of the economic analysis of rescue law possible and
the controversies that it fueled in both the legal and economic fields. It also highlights the influence of the economic analysis
of altruism on this particular field of law and economics.
Keywords Altruism - Good Samaritan laws - Law and economics - Economic analysis of law - Liability - Posner - Epstein - Becker
JEL Classification B2 - K0
A first version of this paper was presented at the ANR History of Altruism Research Group Workshop (December 2007), at the
Erfurt European Workshop in Law and Economics (April 2008), at the 2nd History of Recent Economics Conference (Lisbon, June
2008), at the History of Economic Society Conference (Toronto, June 2008) and at the Canadian Law and Economics Association
annual meetings (Toronto, Septembre 2008).