This paper uses a coalition formation model to explore how equity considerations affect countries’ cooperation on global environmental
issues, e.g. on climate change. When developing countries are exempted from obligations to reduce their emissions, I find
that opening them for abatement projects financed by industrialized countries changes the incentives to cooperate in a way
which can increase emissions and decrease welfare. Equity- concerns in industrialized countries regarding the difference between
their per capita emission levels and those of developing countries lead to increased abatement but do not qualitatively change
the incentives to cooperate. Inequality-aversion with respect to differences to abatement targets across industrialized countries
generally induces larger coalition sizes and stricter abatement. Here, the inclusion of developing countries improves upon
the prospects of cooperation.
Keywords coalition formation - equity preference - inequality aversion - international environmental negotiations - per capita emission levels
JEL classification C7 - D63 - H41 - Q00