The extent to which concepts, memory, and planning are necessary to the simulation of intelligent behavior is a fundamental
philosophical issue in Artificial Intelligence. An active and productive segement of the AI community has taken the position
that multiple low-level agents, properly organized, can account for high-level behavior. Empirical research on these questions
with fully operational systems has been restricted to mobile robots that do simple tasks. This paper recounts experiments
with Hoyle, a system in a cerebral, rather than a physical, domain. The program learns to perform well and quickly, often
outpacing its human creators at two-person, perfect information board games. Hoyle demonstrates that a surprising amount of
intelligent behavior can be treated as if it were situation-determined, that often planning is unnecessary, and that the memory
required to support this learning is minimal. Concepts, however, are crucial to this reactive program's ability to learn and
perform.
Key words Representation - cognitive architecture - concepts - machine learning - game playing