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Efficient, DoS-Resistant, Secure Key Exchange for Internet Protocols
| Book Series | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Publisher | Springer Berlin / Heidelberg |
| ISSN | 0302-9743 (Print) 1611-3349 (Online) |
| Volume | Volume 2467/2002 |
| Book | Security Protocols |
| DOI | 10.1007/3-540-45807-7 |
| Copyright | 2002 |
| ISBN | 978-3-540-44263-9 |
| DOI | 10.1007/3-540-45807-7_5 |
| Pages | 27-39 |
| Subject Collection | Computer Science |
| SpringerLink Date | Tuesday, January 01, 2002 |
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Efficient, DoS-Resistant, Secure Key Exchange for Internet Protocols
William Aiello7 , Steven M. Bellovin7 , Matt Blaze7 , Ran Canetti8 , John Ioannidis7 , Angelos D. Keromytis9 and Omer Reingold7 
| (7) |
AT&T Labs - Research, USA |
| (8) |
IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, USA |
| (9) |
Columbia University in the City of New York, USA |
Abstract
Many public-key-based key setup and key agreement protocols already exist and have been implemented for a variety of applications
and environments. Several have been proposed for the IPsec protocol, and one, IKE [1], is the current standard. IKE has a number of deficiencies, the three most important being that the number of rounds is
high, that it is vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, and the complexity of its specification. (This complexity has led
to interoperability problems, so much so that, several years after its initial adoption by the IETF, there are still completely
non-interoperating implementations).
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