Welcome!
To use the personalized features of this site, please log in or register.
If you have forgotten your username or password, we can help.
|
 |
Higher Order Differential Attack Using Chosen Higher Order Differences
| |
|
Higher Order Differential Attack Using Chosen Higher Order Differences
Shiho Moriai5 , Takeshi Shimoyama6 and Toshinobu Kaneko6, 7 
| (5) |
NTT Laboratories, 1-1 Hikari-no-oka, Yokosuka 239-0847, Japan |
| (6) |
TAO, 1-1-32 Shin-urashima-cho, Kanagawa-ku, Yokohama 221-0031, Japan |
| (7) |
Science University of Tokyo, 2641 Yamazaki, Noda, Chiba 278-8510, Japan |
Abstract
This paper introduces an improved higher order differential attack using chosen higher order differences. We can find a lower
order of the higher order differential by choosing higher order differences. It follows that the designers of a block cipher
can evaluate the lower bound of the number of chosen plaintexts and the complexity required for the higher order differential
attack. We demonstrate an improved higher order differential attack of a CAST cipher with 5 rounds using chosen higher order
differences with fewer chosen plaintexts and less complexity. Concretely, we show that a CAST cipher with 5 rounds is breakable
with 216 plaintexts and < 224 times the computation of the round function, which half the values reported in Fast Software Encryption Workshop’98. We also
show that it is breakable with 213 plaintexts and about 244 times the computation of the round function, which are 1/16-th of those reported in Fast Software Encryption Workshop’97.
Fulltext Preview (Small, Large)
 References secured to subscribers.
|
|
|
|
|
|