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A formal model for integrity protection based on DTE technique
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A formal model for integrity protection based on DTE technique
Ji Qingguang 1  , Qing Sihan 1 and He Yeping 2
| (1) |
Engineering Research Center for Information Security Technology, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100080, China |
| (2) |
Infrastructure Software Engineering Center, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100080, China |
Received: 7 February 2006 Accepted: 7 April 2006
Abstract In order to provide integrity protection for the secure operating system to satisfy the structured protection class’ requirements,
a DTE technique based integrity protection formalization model is proposed after the implications and structures of the integrity
policy have been analyzed in detail. This model consists of some basic rules for configuring DTE and a state transition model,
which are used to instruct how the domains and types are set, and how security invariants obtained from initial configuration
are maintained in the process of system transition respectively. In this model, ten invariants are introduced, especially,
some new invariants dealing with information flow are proposed, and their relations with corresponding invariants described
in literatures are also discussed. The thirteen transition rules with well-formed atomicity are presented in a well-operational
manner. The basic security theorems correspond to these invariants and transition rules are proved. The rationalities for
proposing the invariants are further annotated via analyzing the differences between this model and ones described in literatures.
At last but not least, future works are prospected, especially, it is pointed out that it is possible to use this model to
analyze SE-Linux security.
Keywords formal model - integrity policy - information flow - domain - type
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