In this essay I argue that the evolutionary and comparative study of nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) cognition in a wide
range of taxa by cognitive ethologists can readily inform discussions about animal protection and animal rights. However,
while it is clear that there is a link between animal cognitive abilities and animal pain and suffering, I agree with Jeremy
Bentham who claimed long ago the real question does not deal with whether individuals can think or reason but rather with
whether or not individuals can suffer. One of my major goals will be to make the case that the time has come to expand. The
Great Ape Project (GAP) to The Great Ape/Animal Project (GA/AP) and to take seriously the moral status and rights of all animals
by presupposing that all individuals should be admitted into the Community of Equals. I also argue that individuals count
and that it is essential to avoid being speciesist cognitivists; it really doesn't matter whether ‘dogs ape’ or whether ‘apes
dog’ when taking into account the worlds of different individual animals. Narrow-minded primatocentrism and speciesism must
be resisted in our studies of animal cognition and animal protection and rights. Line-drawing into ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ species
is a misleading speciesist practice that should be vigorously resisted because not only is line-drawing bad biology but also
because it can have disastrous consequences for how animals are viewed and treated. Speciesist line-drawing also ignores within
species individual differences.
Cognitive ethology - animal cognition - The Great Ape Project (GAP) - The Great Ape/Animal Project (GA/AP) - Community of Equals - speciesism - moral individualism - animal rights
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.