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Towards a Unified Model-Based Safety Assessment
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Safety Analysis and Assessment
Towards a Unified Model-Based Safety Assessment
Thomas Peikenkamp1  , Antonella Cavallo2 , Laura Valacca3 , Eckard Böde1 , Matthias Pretzer1 and E. Moritz Hahn1
| (1) |
Kuratorium OFFIS e.V., Escherweg 2, 26121 Oldenburg, Germany |
| (2) |
Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A., Strada Malanghero 17, IT-10072 Caselle, Turin, Italy |
| (3) |
Societa’ Italiana Avionica S.p.A, Strada Antica di Collegno 253, IT-10146 Turin, Italy |
Abstract
The increase of complexity in aircraft systems demands for enhanced analysis techniques. Methods are required that leverage
the burden of their application by reusing existing design and process information and by enforcing the reusability of analyses
results allowing early identification of design’s weak points and check of design alternatives.
This report elaborates on a method that assumes a system specification in an industrial standard notation and allows to perform
several formal safety analyses. Based on a collection of failure models and means of specifying safety requirements, the techniques
produce results along the lines of traditional methods.
We show how to combine traditional techniques, required by the AerospaceRecommendedPractice (SAE-ARP) standards, likeFaultTree
Analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and Common Cause Analysis and also how to automate most of the analysis activities.
The methods described in this paper can be used as means to support the Certification process.
This work was supported by the European Commission within the projects ESACS (Enhanced Safety Assessment for Complex Systems,
FP5), http://www.esacs.org/, and ISAAC (Improvement of Safety Activities on Aeronautical Complex systems, FP6), http://www.isaac-fp6.org/
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