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Evolution of Strategies to Stay in the Game

Jukka Jokela1 and Erkki Haukioja2

(1) Experimental Ecology, ETH-Zürich, ETH-Zentrum NW, CH-8092 Zürich, Switzerland
(2) Section of Ecology, Department of Biology, University of Turku, FIN – 20500 Turku, Finland

Abstract  Life-history evolution is a complexprocess. Life-history theory covers the fundamentallevel of the process, the evolution of life-historytraits. Life-history traits interact; thosecoevolving as a response to the same selectionpressure form life-history tactics. Top level of thehierarchy, life-history strategy, is formed bygenetically interconnected tactics. Our aim is toexpand the traditional view to life-history evolutionby considering what boundary conditions a successfullife-history strategy has to fulfil. We claim thatthe most fundamental condition successful strategieshave to meet is to minimize the risk of evolutionaryfailure. Here the risk of failure refers to failurein transferring practitioners of the strategy to thenext time point, either through survival, or byreproduction. We make an attempt to classify types ofrisks as they lead to evolutionary failure, anddiscuss how risk minimization ideas may be approachedempirically. We conclude that understanding howtraits evolve may not cover all aspects of howstrategies evolve. We emphasize that bookkeeping ofthe actual causes of failure might help in developinglife-history theory that uses causes of selection topredict responses to selection.

evolutionary failure - evolutionary success - fitness - game of life - life-history evolution - natural selection


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